Western Kentucky University

TopSCHOLAR®
Masters Theses & Specialist Projects

Graduate School

1-1979

Occupational Injury Control Through System
Safety Analysis - A Comparative Study
Victor Aeby

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses
Part of the Occupational Health and Industrial Hygiene Commons, and the Training and
Development Commons
Recommended Citation
Aeby, Victor, "Occupational Injury Control Through System Safety Analysis - A Comparative Study" (1979). Masters Theses &
Specialist Projects. Paper 2089.
https://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/2089

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by TopSCHOLAR®. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses & Specialist Projects by
an authorized administrator of TopSCHOLAR®. For more information, please contact topscholar@wku.edu.

OCCUPATIONAL INJURY CONTROL
THROUGH SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS A COMPARATIVE STUDY

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Health and Safety
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, Kentucky

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science

by
Victor G. Aeby
January 1979

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF THESIS

Permission is hereby
Kentucky I_Tniversity Library to
microfilm or other
copies of this thesis for appropriate research or scholarly
purposes.

to the Western
E granted
make, or allow to be made photocopies,

ii

reserved to the author for the making of any copies of this
thesis except for brief sections for research or scholarly
purpo se s.

t-SLY1

Signed

Date

Please place an

I

1

V

X" in the appropriatc: box.

This form will be filed with the original of the thesis and will control
future use of the thesis.

OCCUPATIONAL INJURY CONTROL
THROUGH SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS A COMPARATIVE STUDY

L 6Z
.
i)
birector

of Thesis

02,11J
Approved

October 16, 1978

date

1

bean of the Graduate College
Approved

date
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLPS
vi

ABSTRACT
Chapter
1.

2.

3.

1

INTRODUCTION
Purpose of the Study

4

Statement of the Problem

5

Need for the Study

5

Definitions of Terms

8

Basic Assumptions

9

Limitations of the Study

10

Organization of the Study

10
11

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction

11

What Produces Accidents

11

Safety Program Organization

18
23

METHOD AND DESIGN
Type of Research

23

Data Source

23

Method of Determining Occupational
Injury Rate

24

Method of Determining Occupational
Injury Cost Rate

24

Statistical Technique

25

Summary

26

iii

Page
Chapter
4.

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

32

Summary
5.

27

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND SUMMARY. . .

34

Conclusions

34

Recommendations

35

Summary

36
38

BIBLIOGRAPHY

iv

LIST OF TABLRS
Page

Table
1.

2.

3.

4.

Occupational Injury Rate Per 1000 Man
Hours Worked by Month, Pre-MORT Years
1972-74

28

Occupational Injury Rate Per 1000 Man
Hours Worked by Month, Post-MORT Years
1974-76

29

Cost Per Year of Occupational Injuries
Per 1000 Man Hours Worked, Pre-MORT
Years 1972-74

31

Cost Per Year of Occupational Injuries
Per 1000 Man Hours Worked, Post-MORT
Years 1974-76

31

OCCUPATIONAL INJURY CONTROL THROUGH SYSTE1 SAFETY ANALYSIS A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Victor G. Aeby

December 1978

40 Pages

Directed by "bruce Goodrow, David Dunn and Donald Carter
Department of Health and Safety

Western Kentucky University

The study was a comparative retrospective analysis to
determine the effectiveness of MORT (Management Oversight and
Risk Tree), a system safety method, in reducing the incidence
and cost of occupational injuries occurring at the Tennessee
Wheel and Rubber Company.

Implementation of MORT on April 1,

1974 at the plant facility allowed for statistical comparison
of accidents between the time periods April 1, 1972 through
March 31, 1974 and April 1, 1974 through March 31, 1976.
Data on injury incidence were gathered by researching
the company's worker compensation reports.

Cost figures for

injuries were drawn from computer printouts provided by the
company's insurance carrier.
A reliable figure for the mean incidence of injuries
occurring over the twenty-four month control period and
twenty-four month experimental period was determined by
calculating monthly injuries per one thousand man hours using
the occupational injury rate formula:
Total Number of Occupational Injuries Per Month
X 1000.
Total Number of Man Hours Worked Per Month
A figure for mean occupational injury cost rate was determined
by calculating annual cost of unjuries per one thousand man
vi

hours worked for the control and experimental periods using
the formula:
Total Cost of Occupational Injuries (Year)
Total Number ot Man Hours Worked (Year)

A

1000.

Statistical analyses using a t-test at the .05 level
of significance was applied to determine if MORT implementation was effective in reducing the mean incidence rate and
mean cost of occupational injuries.

Results showed a statis-

tically significant reduction in the occupational injury
incidence rate at the Tennessee Wheel and Rubber Company
following introduction of MORT system safety.

MORT imple-

mentation did not, however, result in a significant reduction
in the cost of occupational injuries between the control and
experimental periods.
The resultant discrepancy in findings (rejection of
Ho1 and acceptance of Ho2) might be explained by:

1) the

fact that no medical cost inflation factor was used when
comparing injury costs between the two time periods under
study, and 2) types of injuries were not differentiated in
terms of severity of injuries.

The findings brought forth

from this research indicate a degree of uncertainty as to
the application of MORT to general industry.

yii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
During the past several years, the number of occupational fatalities averaged 14,200 a year.

From 1960 through

1970, there were over 150,000 job-related fatalities, while
in 1972, more than 50 million employee days were lost because
of disabling injuries.

The known cost of accidents exceeded

11.5 billion dollars.

These figures did not include most of

the deaths and disabling illnesses from occupational disease.1
Employers, unions and various government agencies saw
the need for developing effective programs to improve occupational safety and health.

The importance of keeping employees

safe and healthy received such widespread recognition that a
broad and detailed national program emerged.
The testimony and documentary evidence adduced before
committees of the Senate and House, during deliberations in
1969 and 1970 on Occupational Safety and Health legislation,
pointed up the fact that the American work site was indeed a
place of peril.2

1

U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, Principles and Practices of Occupational Safety and Health, rooklet T (Washington: Government
Print-17g Office, 1971), p. 1.
2
Employment Safety and Health Guide, Guidebook to
Occupational Safety and Health (New York: Commerce Clearing
House, Inc.,
p. 1.
1

The Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health
Act was passed by both Houses of Congress and signed into law
The purpose of the Act was to assure

on December 29, 1970.

every working man and woman a safe and healthful place in
which to work.
Coverage of the Act extended to all employers and
their employees in the fifty states, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and all other territories under
federal jurisdiction.
"affects commerce."

It applied to any employment which

Since its enactment, safety standards

have replaced safety guidelines and requirements have replaced
recommendations.

Occupational health and safety had spread

throughout academia, industry and government.
Prior to Worker's Compensation Legislation in 1911,
all states handled industrial injuries under the "common law"
concept.3

Injured employees had to sue their employer for

recompense.

When management found itself in a position of

having to pay for injuries on the job, it decided it would be
financially better to stop injuries from happening.

This

decision by industry gave birth to the organized safety
movement.
During the early years, the safety movement was
directed towards physical hazards.
showed definite results.

This increased emphasis

During a twenty-year period from

3Daniel C. Peterson, Techniques of Safety Management
(New York: McGraw-Hili, 1971), pp. -11.

1912 to 1933, occupational deaths were reduced from 21,000
lives per year to 14,500.

The National Accident Frequency

Rate per 1,000,000, according to the National Safety Council,
dropped from 15.12 in 1931 to 7.68 in 1969.

During that same

period, the National Severity Rate per 1,000,000 dropped from
1,500 to 640.4
Since the late 1950s, accident rates on the job have
reached a plateau.

Death rates in United States manufacturing

hovered at 9, 10, or 11 deaths per 100,000 workers for the
years 1960 to 1971.

Temporary disability rates increased by

5
62 percent in the same ten-year period.
Companies that had developed even the best safety
programs were finding that an increase in their safety effort
did not necessarily mean a reduction in the frequency and
6
It was
severity of occupational injuries and illnesses.
soon to be realized that the development of new and better
approaches to controlling occupational injuries were needed
to enhance employee safety.
Improved safety methods have emerged during the
decade of the 70s and the records of the aerospace, nuclear
reactor, and weapons programs attest to the effectiveness of
these procedures.

One such method, the Management Oversight

4Peterson, Techniques, p. 10.
5William G. Johnson, The Marla ement Oversi ht and
Risk Tree - MORT, Energy Research and DevelopcnenflAdxninistration, No. SAN 821-2 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1973,) pp. 1-3.
6
W. T. Parker, "Has Safety Progress Ended?", National
Safety News, 23 (October 1969), 32.

4
and Risk Tree (MORT), is a system safety program originally
developed for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).

The method

was retained by the Division of Operational Safety (DOS) now known as the Division of Safety, Standards, and Compliance
(SSC) - during the Atomic Energy Commission's transition to
the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA).
The goal of the ERDA-MORT program was to reduce the ERDA 1975
7
accident rates by an order of magnitude by 1986.
MORT provides an analytical method for considering
all elements of an individual safety program.

It provides

guidelines for judging the adequacy of these elements in the
prevention of accidents and incidents.

The Management Over-

sight and Risk Tree (MORT) does not represent a new and
untried methodology, rather it does represent the synthesis
of those safety program elements that are effective in reducing occupational injuries and illnesses.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to compare the incidence
and cost of recorded occupational injuries at the Tennessee
Wheel and Rubber Company during the periods April 1, 1972
through March 31, 1974 (the control period) and April 1, 1974
through March 31, 1976 (the experimental period) as a function
of system safety methods employed during the experimental
period.

7Robert W. Eicher, MORT Question and Answer Packa e,
Energy Research and Development Aainistration cwas ng on,
D.C., 1 974). p- 3-

5
itatement of the Problem
The research problem in this study was to determine
the effect of MOST, a system safety method, on the number and
cost of injuries experienced by the Tennessee Wheel and
Rubber Company.8

The time period under consideration in this

study represented insurance policy periods from April 1, 1972
through March 31, 1976.
The basic hypotheses of this study were as follows:
Ho 1

There is no significant difference in the mean
incidence rates of occupational injuries between
the time periods April 1, 1972 to March 31, 1974
and April 1, 1974 to March 31, 1976.

Ho 2

There is no significant difference in the mean
costs of occupational injuries between the time
periods April 1, 1972 to March 31, 1974 and April
1, 1974 to March 31, 1976.
Need for the Study
Various studies and authorities have failed to record

the continued effectiveness of "traditionally laden" methods
of controlling occupational injuries.9

In steel and in other

8
The premise of a system safety method is that a
simple logic or decision tree, which structures all of the
presently known causal factors and/or preventive measures in
an order which integrates safety concepts into a coherent
whole, can assure greater control of accident variables.
9Lawrence Ellis, "A Review of Research on Efforts to
Promote Occupational Safety," Journal of Safety Research, 5,
No. 4 (December 1975), 180-187.

industries, the present accepted safety practices are job
safety analysis, job instruction and training, and a safety
observation plan.
The desire for improved loss prevention methods does
not stem from any describable failure of old safety methods
but from a desire to systematically control recognized
hazards within a workplace.

After some four decades of

accident rate decline, a plateau, followed by a decade of
slow increase in rates has been a widespread experience both
in the United States and abroad.

Many leading industries

that have attained low occupational injury rates in the past
are now seeking an even higher level of safety.

It is

unreasonable to conclude that these employers can make
further progress by simply doing more, or better in their
present program.

It becomes increasingly apparent that a

different, more effective approach is needed to assure a
major reduction in occupational injuries.
The trials at Aerojet Nuclear Company and their
announced goal of an order of magnitude reduction in already
low accident rates
10
research.

have served as a major impetus for this

Jack L. Clark, Systems Safety Development,

Aerojet Nuclear Company, feels that as a result of numerous
pilot studies over a four-year period, the Energy Research
and Development Company will continue to support the development and training of personnel within Aercjet and throughout

10
Robert W. Eicher, MORT Package, p. 3.

7
the United States in the application of this method.

11

Robert J. Nertney, Manager of Systems Safety Development Center, Aerojet Nuclear Company, feels that the preliminary results of trials at Aerojet have shown an ability
to assist persons from a discipline other than safety to
quickly apply and broaden their skills in accident appraisal.
Outside the aerospace industry, there exists no model
that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of loss prevention programs.

Even though this study is committed to

the manufacturing industry, this research will serve as
motivation for similar studies at other selected industrial
groups.
As the duties of persons responsible for plant safety
become increasingly complex, their ability to systematically
work through difficult problems becomes important to their
overall effectiveness.

Application of the MORT system in

the aerospace industry has demonstrated some degree of
effectiveness and utilization potential of the MORT model.
It remains now to determine if the system can he effective
in the general industry environment.

11

Statement by Jack L. Clark, personal interview,
Nashville, Tennessee, July 21, 1975.
12
Statement by Robert Nertney, personal interview,
Nashville, Tennessee, October 19, 1976.

12

Definitions of Terms
1.

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).

A United States

board formed in 1946 for the domestic control of atomic
energy.
2.

Employee.

A person hired by another to work for

wages or salary.
3.

Energy Research and Development Administration

A United States Board formed to coordinate and con-

,(ERDA).

trol the development of energy sources.
4.

Insurance Policy Period.

A twelve-month period

of time from April 1st of each year through March 31st of
the next year.
5.

Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT).

A logic or decision tree which structures causal factors
and/or preventive measures in order to control losses.
6.

Occupational Injury.

Physical harm to a person

in the course of his employment.
7.

Occupational Injury Cost Rate.

Dollar value of

injuries occurring in a twelve-month period divided by the
total man hours worked in the same period of time multiplied
by one thousand.
8.

Occupational Injury Rate.

Number of injuries in

a twelve-month period divided by the total number of man
hours worked in the same period of time multiplied by one
thousand.

9
Safety.

The quality or condition of being free

from danger, injury, or damage.
10.

System Safety.

A method to control certain risk

factors which contribute to losses.
11.

Worker's Compensation Report.

Information con-

tained in a document pertaining to an employee injury or
occupational disease suffered in connection with his employment.
12.

NatJ.onal Accident Frequency Rate.

The total

number of disabling injuries times one million, divided by
man-hours of employment (exposure) during the period covered.
13.

National Severity Rate.

The total number of days

lost due to disability times one million, divided by total
employee man-hours of exposure.
14.

Order of Magnitude.

A logrithimic number given

to a quantity for purposes of comparison with other quantities
of the same class.

For example:

a reduction of accidents for

one order of magnitude would be 103 down to 102.
Basic Assumptions
The following basic assumptions were considered
essential for this study:
1.

The workers' compensation report will supply the

requisite information.
2.

The responses to questionnaire items are based

on the participants real or true feelings.

10
Limitations of the Stuly
1.

There was no comparison group or control popula-

tion for this study; therefore, conclusions resulting from
this research may be generalized only to the study population
involved.
2.

The study was concerned with the number of

worker's compensation reports.

It was not concerned with any

other aspects of the report.
3.

The study was concerned with the annual cost of

worker's compensation insurance.

It was not concerned with

individual costs per case.
4.

The study was not concerned with the structure

of a safety program or the structure of a MORT systems safety
program.
Organization of the Study
Following an introductory chapter defining the purpose and need of the study, a review of literature is presented.

This historical overview emphasizes factors which

produce accidents and specific components of organized safety
programs.
Methodology and design of the study are presented in
Chapter 3.

The procedure for determination of rates and the

statistical technique for hypotheses testing are outlined in
this chapter.
The analysis and interpretation of data are discussed
next, followed by a final chapter containing conclusions from
the findings as well as recommendations for further study.

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
At the time of this study, system safety programs
were a relatively recent trend.

The early 1970s might be

described as a period of increasing concern over the limited
usefulness of existing methods of accident prevention.

During

this period there grew a demand for formulation of an ideal
system of controlling losses.
This review will emphasize concepts of accident prevention and the integration of system safety with present
safety practices.

Included will be a discussion of those

factors which produce accidents (and man-hour losses) as
well as organization of safety programs to date.
What Produces Accidents
As a result of Johnson's studies at Aerojet Nuclear
Company, a new definition of "accident" emerged:
An accident can be defined as an unwanted transfer
of energy because of the lack of barriers and/or
controls producing injury to persons, property, or
process, preceded by sequences of planning and operational errors which: failed to adjust to change in
physical or human factors and produced unsafe

11

12
conditions and/or unsafe acts, arising out of the
risk in an activity and interrupting or degrading
the activity.1
The basis for the Johnson definition is found in a
study by Haddon suggesting that an accident is multifactorial
in nature and occurs as a result of an unwanted flow of
2
Nertney, Clark, and Eicher
energy due to lack of barriers.
outlined these energy forms as (1) kinetic, (2) thermal,
(3) electrical, (4) ionizing and non-ionizing radiation,
7

(5) acoustic, and (6) biologic.'
Traditional safety concepts were based on the theory
that individuals create their own accident situations due to
unsafe acts.

Champanis, in a 1970 address to the National

Safety Council, disagreed with the traditional concept by
supporting the Johnson definition.

Champanis stated, "The

reason errors occur in an activity is because the people
involved are not able to cope with the way equipment is
designed and the procedures to be followed."4

McCormick,

also de-emphasizing the traditional human error concept,

1

William G. Johnson, The Management OversiEht and
Risk Tree, Energy Research and Development Administration,
No. AN 821-2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 973).
p. 25.
2w

illiam Haddon, Jr., "The Prevention of Accidents,"
Preventive Medicine, 11 (1966), 42.
3Robert J. Nertney, Jack L. Clark, and E. W. Eicher,
Occupancy-Use Readiness Manual, Energy Research and Development Administration, No. 76-45-1 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1976), 1-3.
4
Alphonse Champanis, "The Error-Provocative Situation,"
Symposium on Measurement of Safety Performance, in an address
to the -National Safety Council at Los Angeles, California,
1970.

13
points to the fact that human use of virtually any man-made
5
thing can be enhanced or conversely degraded by its design.
T. M. Khalil, in writing about the relationship of
man and machine, postulated that whenever man's physical or
psychological limitations are extended beyond their capabilities, the cost is inevitable whether in terms of economic
6
cost or loss of human resources.

Taylor wrote of the role

of psychology in designing machines which require less of
man yet exploit his special abilities.

He felt that

engineering aims first at building a better system and only
second at improving the operator.7
Johnson's theory,that errors in an activity stem from
one or more planning or design stages at a higher level,promoted the philosophy that the best way to minimize errors is
by a continual, systematic awareness of human factors in the
B
planning, design, installation, and maintenance of equipment.
Berberich supports this supposition in writing, "Injury control can be achieved through a team effort in which all

York:

'Ernest J. McCormick, Human Factors Engineering (New
McGraw-Hi)l, 1976), pp. 3-15.

6
T. M. Khalil, "Design Tools and Machines to Fit the
Man," Journal of Industrial Engineering, 4 (January, 1972),
32.
F. ':. Taylor, "Psychology and the Design of
Machines," The American Psychologist, 12 (1957), 249-258.
6
Johnson, MORT, p. 25.

14
members contribute their expertise towards the solution of
9
problems.
Russell Miller, Director of Safety at the Monsanto
Company, approaches the problem of error reduction by
starting with top management policies and continuing through
engineering start-up and yearly audits by corporate staff.10
This systematic managerial approach to error reduction was
promoted by Peters, when describing the Defense Department's
objective of safety based on consistency of effort in all
divisions of the Department, he stated, "the degree of
error reduction depends directly upon management emphasis
11
The
during and throughout the life cycle of an activity."
DuPorlt Company's philosophy of accident prevention is
similar:

"Since management, which includes all levels

through foreman, has the responsibility for every operational
activity of the company, each supervisor has the responsi,12
bility of preventing personal injuries.

9N. J. Berberich, Jr., "Occupational Injury Control,"
Occupational Health and Safety Synposia, U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and- Welfare, No. 76-136 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1976), 61-182.
10
Russell L. Miller, "The Changing Challenge of Loss
Control In the Chemical Industry," Proceedings of the Second
International System Safety Conference, Systems Safety Society
, pp.i30-139.
SriFTeg-Tray
11

George A. Peters, "System Safety Management,"
Hazard Prevention, 14, No. 1 (September 1977), 11-17.
1. DuPont and Company, Inc., Safety and Fire
2E. I.
1'E.
967), pp. 1-7.
Protection Reference Guide for Company Units

15
Throughout the literature, writers are quick to note
New employees,

the important intervening factor of change.

transfers, new projects, and adjustments can have an adverse
impact on even the soundest safety methods.

As Johnson sug-

gests, "each change is believed to create the potential of
13
human error."

Kepner and Tregoe identified characteristics

of change in relation to accident prevention:
(1) The sensitivity to impending or probable
change is a key quality of a good manager or safety
coordinator, (2) the significance of change is that
jobs such as construction are continually changing,
(3) sensitivity to change situations such as transfers, new operations, and new materials is essential
and (4) necessary to augment the essential feedback
to detect changes that could contribute to an
accident. 14
Knox and Eicher suggested that the practice of change analysis
gives the analyst the ability to determine whether changes are
needed in a stable operational system or a changing operational
system requires safety-related counter changes.

15

Kepner and

Tregoe supported the Knox and Eicher development of change
analysis by stating, "When hunting for the cause of a problem,
the kind of change that could produce this certain kind of

13
Johnson, MORT, p. 25.
14
Charles H. Kepner and Benjamin B. Tregoe, The
Rational Manager (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 7.

15N.

W. Knox and E. W. Eicher, MORT Users Manual,
Energy Research and Development Administration, No. 76145-A
(Virginia: National Technical Information Service, 1976),
PP. 1-b.

result must be determined.

A problem must be identified

16
before a solution can be determined."
The real cause of a problem, according to Crowe and
Douglas, is some change that occurs in the process as it moves
toward the expected purpose or outcome.17

This theory is based

on an earlier theory - Heinrich's Domino Theory - suggesting
that loss is a result of factors occurring in a sequence.

If

the series of events is interrupted by the elimination of one
of the factors making up the series, the loss cannot occur.
Each element in the chain of events is a result of chance.
Heinrich's theory was a subject of criticism in the
writings of some safety analysts however.

In differing with

the Domino theory, Brenner postulated that a loss occurs
because factors, conditions, and events (changes) interface
through different chains and at different

times.1 -9

Peterson

went so far as to say that, "the narrow-mindedness of the
Heinrich theory has severely limited our ability to find and
20
deal with multiple causes of a loss.

Charles H. Kepner and Benjamin B. Tregoe, Analytic
Trouble Shooting (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 10-17.

17.
ooan M. Crowe and Hugh M. Douglas t Effective Loss
Prevention (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1976), pp. 43-92.

18-

W. Heinrich, Industrial Accident Prevention (New
McGraw-Hill, 1959,) PP. 3-20.
19
Ludwig Brenner, Hazardous Materials Emergencies
(Lufrin Industries Publication, 1976), p. 25.
York:

20
Daniel C. Peterson, Techniques of Safety Management
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. 13.

7
Surrey utilized an epidemiological model to describe
21
and determine the cause of specific problems.
the use of a series of questions was

He felt that

needed to fully expose

the areas contributing to the problem.

Mausner and Bahn

furthered this concept by stating "a basic tenet of epidemiology is that an ecological or multi-factorial approach is
necessary to explain the occurrence of disease.

Disease can-

22
not be attributed to the operation of any one factor."

In a

September, 1975 National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health Symposia held in Cincinnati, Ohio, Bahn made note of
the functional use of epidemiological models utilizing the
same 'question' concept brought forth by Kepner and Tregoe,23
In summary, whether it be a disease or an accident,
one organism or one event is not sufficient to account for
the problem;

other factors must be considered.

And any

analysis of such a problem must take into account the potentiality of change for affecting a safety system.
The following section will be devoted to the components of a safety program.

The literature cited will focus

upon attempts to organize an effective safety program in an
effort to control losses.

21

J. Surrey, Industrial Accident Research - A Human
Engineering Appraisal (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1968), pp. 12-24.
2
2Judith S. Mausner and Anita K. Bahn, Epidemiology An Introductory Text (St. Louis: W. B. Saunders Company,
1974), pp. 21-40.
23
Anita K. Bahn, "Epidemiology for the Part-time
Occupational Physician," Occupational Safety and Health
Symposium, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 1-24.

1e
Safety Program Organization
The value of a well-organized safety program in
preserving property and life has been debated.

In a review

of occupational safety research, Ellis writes:
Safety experts generally can be divided into
two schools of thought - those who see accident
reduction as largely an engineering problem and
those who consider it a matter of human motivation
and education.24
Knaff saw the importance of proper engineering techniques in safety program organization.

He wrote, "In con-

sidering man-machine, the major design freedoms lie with the
machine-related or equipment-related factors.

It is far

easier to alter the characteristics of a machine than to alter
the characteristics of a man."25

In other safety literature,

Ayob and Bowen also suggest designing the machine to fit the
26
man.
A number of studies illustrate the difficulty man
encounters operating the machine.

In an earlier writing,

Holding noted variations that occur between men in their

24

Lawrence Ellis, "A Review of Research on Efforts to
Promote Occupational Safety," Journal of Safety Research, 5,
No. 4 (December 1975), 180-187.
25
Robert P. Knaff, "Man-Machine Compatability: A
Highway Safety Essential," Proceedix s of the Second International System Safety Conference, System Safety Society
Series (July 1975), pp. 242-251.
26
M. M. Ayob, "Sitting Down on the Job (Properly),"
Industrial Design (April 1972), pp. 1-3; H. M. Bowen, "The
Imp in the System," Economics, 10 (1967), 112-119.

19
27
tendencies to operate display controls.

In researching the

effects of noise on human performance, Jerison showed a relationship between noise levels and changes in human performance
28
in related tasks.
Similar performance variations to machine
tasks have been studied in relation to differences in lighting.
Khalil, in a summary of research regarding performance changes
due to certain extrinsic factors, theorized the following:
In order to obtain the optimal results in the
design of man-machine systems, there are four basic
decision rules in which to follow. These rules are
(1) man is the center of design, (2) utilize principles of kinesiology, (3) observe physiological
00
capacity, and (4) apply psychological principles.'
The benefits of and techniques for human motivation
and safety education have been brought forth in the writing
of several safety analysts,

most notably Hammer and Bush.3°

Also attesting to the value of organized safety programs are
the National Safety Council and the American Society of
Safety Engineers.

Neither of the organizations, although

both publish information concerning safety organization, are
specific as to the best type of organized system safety

27D. H. Holding, "Direction of Motion Relationships
Between Control and Displays in Different Planes," Journal of
Applied Psychology, 41 (January 1957), 93-97.
28
H. F. Jerison, "Effects of Noise on Human Performance," 1.2anE12IJILEL1WalLEaall°12EY, 43 (May 1959), 96-101.
29
Khalil, "Design Tools and Machines," p. 32.
3°Willie Hammer, Occupational
Hammer
Safety Management and
E ineerinK (Chicago: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), pp. 144154; Vincent G. Bush, SafetyJn the Construction Industry:
OSHA (Reston Publishing-77E5any,
7)), pp. 1-34.
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methods.

Opinions differ widely concerning the necessary

components of such programs.
Covert felt an important component of any safety
program is the use of committees within each industry to
serve as a monitor for safety organization.

Covert suggested

the establishment of a "Hazard Committee" to review and
approve new materials in the plant.3/

Drawing from a 1974

fire prevention study, Belles outlined the need for another
component of a sound safety program —that of a "plant
emergency organization plan" and the training of all employees
32
Similarly, this
in the use of fire suppression equipment.
education component was recommended by Aeby in a 1976 study
33
dealing with worker motivation and safety education.

This

concept of safety motivation and education first gained
34
Interestingly,
attention in the writing of Heinrich.
Heinrich described the concept as "used by man to reduce
injury since the beginning of time."35

31

Roy J. Covert, "An Occupational Health Study of a
Selected Memphis Tennessee Chemical Plant," (consultant's
report, 1975). Report on file at company office: 114 Trail
East, Hendersonville, Tennessee.
32
Donald Belles, "Fire Prevention Study - Tennessee
Wheel and Rubber Company" (consultant's report, 1974).
Report on file at company office: 114 Trail East, Hendersonville, Tennessee.
33Victor G. Aeby, "Loss Prevention Study for a
Selected Rockford Illinois Manufacturing Plant" (consultant's
report, 1976). Report on file at company office: 114 Trail
East, Hendersonville, Tennessee.
34H. W. Heinrich, Industrial Accident Prevention
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 8124.

35Ib1d„ p. /0.
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Ellis identified five basic components of a safety
program that should be used by government and industry for
reducing work injuries and man-hour losses.

Those components,

quite general in nature, are 1) industrial safety laws and
inspections, 2) employee safety training, 3) transmittal of
accident statistics to company officials, 4) management36
sponsored safety programs, and 5) economic sanctions.
Ellis's safety elements seemed to be consistent with the
earlier, widely-read views of W. G. Johnson who wrote:
The basic elements of a safety program should
consist of 1) management implementation of a sound
safety policy, 2) a defined hazard analysis process
to minimize errors and oversights, 3) work situations
which provide the environment and direction to enable
people to perform capably and safely, 4) an information system which provides monitoring to promptly
detect risks and deviations from safety plans,
knowledge of hazards and correcting measures, and
prompt feedback on safety performance, and 5) opportunity fo 7all members of the organization to participate.''
One might conclude from the literature cited that
there is no exact remedy, no one set of components of a safety
program that can assure control of losses.

Johnson's elements

of safety organization, though thought to be a comprehensive
approach, still largely are theoretical in nature and remain
untested.

36

Perhaps Chelius best sums up past efforts to

L. Ellis, "A Review of Research," p. 18.

37Johnson, MORT, pp. 131-132.
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control losses by stating:
We are at a point where further anecdotes and
even theoretical developments are of limited value.
Only by empirical analysis can we hope to develop
programs wh4qh are based on more than just good
intentions.,4c

38J. R. Chelius, "The Control of Industrial Accidents:
Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence," Law and Contemporary
Problems (1974), Pp. 38-40.

CHAPTER 3
METHOD AND DESIGN
Type of Research
This research was a comparative retrospective study
of the number and cost of occupational injuries occurring at
the Tennessee Wheel and Rubber Company from fiscal periods
April 1, 1972 through March 31, 1974 and April 1, 1974 through
March 31, 1976.

Implementation of a MORT system safety method

in April, 1974 allowed for statistical analysis of losses by
using a basic comparative design.

For the purposes of this

research design, April 1, 1972 through March 31, 1974 served
as the control period (pre-MORT period) and April 1, 1974
through March 31, 1976 served as the experimental period
(post-MORT period).
Data Source
The data were hand collated by researching the
Tennessee Wheel and Rubber Company's worker compensation
reports for the pre-MORT and post-MORT time periods.

Annual

cost figures for occupational injuries were drawn from computer printout analyses provided by the company's insurance
carrier, Reliance Insurance Company of Nashville, Tennessee.
Permission for using the Tennessee Wheel and Rubber
Company's worker compensation reports and company insurance
23
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expense records was secured verbally from company president,
James Hutton.
Method of Determining Occupational Injury Rate
In order tc determine a reliable figure for the
incidence of occupational injuries incurred for the twentyfour month pre-MORT and twenty-four month post-MORT periods,
the calculations of injuries per one thousand man hours were
These values were obtained as follows:

needed.

Total Number of Occupational
Injuries Per Month
X
Occupational Injury Rate - Total Number of Man Hours
Worked Per Month

1000

An example of the procedure for calculating occupational
injury is shown below:
(A) 6 recorded occupational injuries in March, 1973
(B) 3891 recorded total man hours worked in March, 1973

g7T = .00154 x 1000 = 1.54202 per 1000 man hours
(C) 36
The mean scores for the pre-MORT and post-MORT periods
were determined by summing the monthly rates over the twentyfour month control and the twenty-four month experimental
periods.
Method of Determining_ Occupational Injury Cost Rate
Reliable figures for occupational injury cost rates
for the pre-MORT and post-MORT periods were determined by
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calculating the annual cost of occupational injuries per one
thousand man hours worked.

These yearly cost values were

obtained by utilizing the following formula:

Occupational
injury Cost Rate

_
-

Total Cost of Occupational
Injuries (Year)
Total Number or Man hours
Worked (Year)

X

1000

An example of the procedure for calculating the occupational
injury cost rate is as follows:
(A) $12,550 total cost recorded for occupational injuries
in 1973
(B) 119,500 recorded total man hours worked in 1973

(c)

119,500

= .10502 x l000,$105.02

per 1000 man hours

The mean occupational injury cost rates for the preMORT and post-MORT periods were then determined by summing
the annual cost rates over the two-year experimental period
and the two-year control period.
Statistical Technique
The use of a t-test was employed at the .05 level of
significance to determine

1) whether there was a significant

difference in the mean incidence rate of occupational injuries
between the pre-MORT time period April 1, 1972 through March
31, 1974 and the post-MORT period April 1, 1974 through
March 31, 1976; and, 2) whether there was a significant
difference in the mean cost of occupational injuries between
the pre-MORT and post-MORT periods at the Tennessee Wheel and
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Rubber Company.

The null hypotheses tested were,

1) Ho1 - there is no significant difference in the mean
incidence rate of occupational injuries at the Tennessee Wheel
and Rubber Company between the periods April 1, 1972 through
March 31, 1974 and April 1, 1974 through March 31, 1976.
2) Ho2 - there is no significant difference in the mean cost
of occupational injuries at the Tennessee Wheel and Rubber
Company between the periods April 1, 1972 through March 31,
1974 and April 1, 1974 through March 31, 1976.
L-u_au1211
The research was a comparative study of the difference
in the mean incidence ratesand mean costsof occupational
injuries at the Tennessee Wheel and Rubber Company between
the periods April 1, 1972 through March 31, 1974 and April 1,
1974 through March 31, 1976.

Using a t-test at the .05 level

of significance, the null hypotheses were tested and the
effectiveness of MORT implementation in terms of injury
incidence reduction and cost reduction was determined.

CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
The first hypothesis considered after data analysis
was the hypothesis that stated:

there is no significant

difference in the mean incidence rate of occupational injuries
at the Tennessee Wheel end Rubber Company between the periods
April 1, 1972 through March 31, 1974 and April 1, 1974 through
March 31, 1976.

Table 1 presents the frequency of occupa-

tional injury, total man hours worked, and the occupational
injury rate per one thousand man hours worked for the preMORT period.
Prior to computation of statistical differences
between means, the occupational injury data for the post-MORT
period had to be determined.

The results are illustrated in

Table 2.
The mean occupational injury rate per 1000 for the
pre-MORT period was .553255 with a standard deviation of
.29616.

The mean occupational injury rate per 1000 for the

post-MORT period was .372212 with a standard deviation of
.22138.

Upon determining these intermediate values for the

pre-MORT and post-MORT periods, the t-test procedure was
applied to determine if a significant statistical difference
resulted in the mean occupational injury rates between the
pre-MORT and post-MORT periods.
as follows:
27

The t-value was computed
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Table 1
Occupational Injury Rate Per 100J Man Hours Worked
by Month, Pre-MORT Years 1972-74
Injury Rate
Per 1000 Man Hours

Month

Number of
Injuries

Man Hours
Worked

April '72

4

9,511

.42057

May
June

4
8

9,890

.40445

10,679

July

5

August

8

10,379
11,155

.74913
.48174

12

11,185

1.07287

5

11,487
11,509

.43539

9,261

1.07980

8,065

.61996

9,953
9,207

.20094

September
October
November
December
January '73

3
10

.71717

.26067

February

5
2

March

6

April

10,021

.79832

May

8
c
.

8,364

.59780

June

8

July

3

9,392
10,121

.85179
.29641

August

5

.58153

September
October

5
6

8,598
9,285
10,221

November

8

10,542

December

2

11,232

.75887
.17806

January '74

0

10,750

.0

February

0

10,560

.0

March

1

10,478

.99544

123

241,844

13.27812

Total

.65168

.53850
.58703
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Table 2
Occupational Injury Rate Per 1000 Man Hours
Worked by Month, Fost-MCRT Years 1974-76
Month

Number of
Injuries

Man Hours
Worked

Injury Rate
Per 1000 Man Hours

April '74
May

6

10,202

.58812

5

June

4

10,123
10,200

.49392
.39216

July

5

10,532

.47474

August

5

10,386

.48142

September

5

9,880

.50607

October

4

9,950

.40201

November

5
4

11,159
8,120

.44807
.48900

5,467

.73166

February

4
1

5,467

.18292

March

2

5,475

.36530

April

5

5,533

.90367

May

6,308

.47559

June

3
1

10,046

.09954

July

3

9,872

.30389

August

3

10,066

.02998

September

5

11,283

.44314

October

10,927

November

6
1

11,554

.54910
.09655

December

1

8,472

.11804

January '76

2

8,128

.24606

February

0

8,237

.0

March

1

8,186

.12216

81

215,573

8.93311

December
January '75

Total
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t=
2
n 1 -1)(s 1) + (n2-1)(s22)

F

\V

(n1 + n2) - 2

The resulting analysis yielded the following:
.55326 - .37221
1
(23)(.29616)2 + (23)(.22138)2 , 1
74 4- 74 i
46
The calculations revealed a t-value of 2.398.

This

calculated t-value exceeded the critical value of 2.069 which
1
resulted in the rejection of Ho . Therefore, the reduction
in the mean occupational injury rate following MORT implementation is statistically significant at the .05 level.
The second hypothesis considered after data analysis
was the hypothesis that stated:

there is no significant

difference in the mean cost of occupational injuries at the
Tennessee Wheel and Rubber Company between the periods
April 1, 1972 through March 31, 1974 and April 1, 1974 through
March 31, 1976.

The total cost of occupational injuries per

year, the total man hours worked per year, and calculations
of occupational injury cost per 1000 man hours worked for the
pre-MORT years are presented in Table 3.
Occupational injury cost data in Table 4 presents the
total cost of injuries, total man hours worked and the cost
of injuries per 1000 man hours worked for the post-MORT years
April 1, 1974 through March 31, 1976.
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Table 3
Cost Per Year of Occupational Injuries
Per 1000 Man Hours Worked, Pre-MORT Years 1972-74
Total Cost
Per Year

Man Hours Worked
Per Year

Cost Per 1000
Man Hours Worked

$11,729.00

122,281

$ 95.92

$12,498.00

119,564

$104.53

Table. 4
Cost Per Year of Occupational Injuries
Per 1000 Man Hours Worked, Post-MORT Years 1974-76

Total Cost
Per Year

Man Hours Worked
Per Year

Cost Per 1000
Man Hours Worked

$13,911.00

106,961

$130.06

$11,627.00

108,612

$107.05

Computation of mean occupational injury cost for the
pre-MORT years yielded a mean value of $100.23, with a
standard deviation of 4.3049.

The mean occupational injury

cost rate for the pre-MORT years was found to be $118.56,
with a standard deviation of 11.5050.

To determine whether

a significant difference existed for the mean cost of occupational injuries between the pre-MORT and post-MORT years, the
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following t-test procedure was utilized:

t=

1 - x 2
2
2
/ (ni -1)(s 1 ) + (n2-1)(s 2)
4- n2') -2(1111
'1

1
F2)

Statistical analysis of t is shown by the following:
100.22 - 118.56
(1)(18.5322J + (1)(132.3650)
2

). +
4

The resulting analysis determined a t-value of
The calculated t-value was found to be less than
2
the critical value of 12.706. Therefore, Ho was not re-

-2.1141.

jected and the difference in the mean cost of occupational
injuries between the control and experimental years was found
not to be significant.
Summary
In determining the statistical difference in mean
occupational injury rates between the pre-MORT control period
and the post-MORT experimental period, the calculated t-value
of 2.398 was found to exceed the critical value of 2.069,
1
thus rejecting Ho . Therefore, the mean occupational injury
rate reduction following implementation of a MORT system
safety method was statistically significant (p:=-.05).
Data analysis of the difference in mean cost of
occupational injuries between the pre-MORT and posc-MORT
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periods showed a t-value of -2.1141 compared to the critical
value of 12.706, thus Ho2 was not rejected at the .05 level
of confidence.

Implementation of the MORT system safety

method, therefore, was found not to be statistically significant in terms of the reduction in mean cost of occupational
injuries between the control and experimental periods.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS,

--,.Y
..COM:NDATIONS, AND S."
Conclusions

The statistical evidence brought forth from this
research lends itself to several general conclusions.

The

most noteworthy of these conclusions is the implementation
of a MCRT system safety program at the Tennessee Wheel and
Rubber Company on April 1, 1974 resulting in a statistically
significant reduction in occupational injury incidence rate
at that facility for the experimental period under study.
Such a reduction in the incidence rate of occupational
injuries could theoretically have a positive impact on total
production, worker efficiency, and ultimately, company
profits.
The statistical analyses has also led to the general
conclusion that MORT implementation at the Tennessee Wheel
and Rubber Company on April 1, 1974 did not reduce the cost
of occupational injuries for the experimental period studied.
The notable discrepancy in the findings of this research
indicating a resultant reduction in incidence but not cost
of occupational injuries following the introduction of a
system safety program, deserves further consideration.

This

inconsistency in findings might be explained by the fact that
is calculating the mean differences in the cost of injuries
between the pre-MORT and post-MORT years, no
34
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adjustment factor was used to account for medical care cost
inflation variance between the experimental years, 1972-1974,
and the control years, 1974-1976.
Another explanation for the inconsistency in findings
might be that since no differentiation of injury types was
described in this research design, one cannot conclude that
the severity of injuries in the pre-MORT period was to the
same degree as in the post-MORT period.

Even though the

reported incidence of injuries was significantly reduced in
the experimental period, the injuries that took place in the
experimental period may have been more severe in nature, thus
accounting for higher injury cost rates.
Recommendations
The conclusions derived from the research presented
give rise to the following recommendations:
1.

Any occupational health study designed to deter-

mine the effectiveness of a system safety program in reducing
costs for injuries should concern itself with exact types of
injuries incurred.

Comparison of the severity of injuries

between the research periods being studied will yield a more
representative view of occupational injury costs.
2.

Further research in system safety program effec-

tiveness should take into account inflation variances for the
years in study.
3.

Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) is a

systen safety method for analyzing various elements of safety
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programs and provides certain guidelines for judging the
effectiveness of safety program components within an industry.
MORT does not, however, detail specific system safety techniques for reducing losses.

For this reason, the safety

techniques used within a particular industry will continue
to vary from other industries despite introduction of a MORT
system.
It is recommended that future research address the
actual structure of the system safety program.

This way any

deficiencies of the safety program in the industry or
industries being studied can be weighed against man hour
losses in those industries.

Analyzing each component of the

safety program being researched would minimize the threats
to the Internal validity of the study that might result from
industries that are grossly negligent in one or more facets
of their safety programs.
Summary
The purpose of this study was to determine the effect
of a MORT system safety program on the incidence and cost of
occupational injuries at the Tennessee Wheel and Rubber
Company.

The time periods considered in this research were

April 1, 1972 through March 31, 1974 (the control period) and
April 1, 1974 through March 31, 1976 (the experimental period).
Hol, which stated:

there is no significant difference in the

mean incidence rate of occupational injuries between the preMORT and post-MORT periods, was rejected at the .05 level of
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significance.

The statistical analysis (using a t-test)

found the reduction in the mean occupational injury rate
following MORT implementation to be statistically significant.
Ho2, which stated:

there is a significant difference in the

mean cost of occupational injuries between the pre-MORT and
post-MORT periods, was accepted by the use of a t-test at the
.05 level of significance.

Statistical analysis found the

reduction in the mean cost of occupatio_ll injuries at the
Tennessee Wheel and Rubber Company following MORT implementation not to be statistically significant.
The findings of this research are supportive of only
a handful of studies attesting to the effectiveness of system
safety in reducing occupational losses.

Even in the aerospace

industry where the MORT technique has gained the acceptance
of top-level management, pilot study results have shown little
more than an ability to assist persons from a discipline other
than safety to quickly apply and broaden their skill in
accident appraisal.

Clearly, important gaps remain in knowl-

edge of the efficacy of MORT system safety.
to general industry remains uncertain.

Its application
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